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## ABSTRACT

An analysis of the history of U.S.-Soviet exchanges suggests answers to questions that a number of private foundations have raised about the range and effectiveness of such programs. Government-sponsored exchange activity grew from the late 1950's through the 1970's. Since the beginning of the Reagan administration, government funding has decreased and the private sector has taken up some of the slack. Both public and private programs have shared many objectives, including scholarly exchange, growth of trade, and mutual understanding. The objectives of private programs have also included education about political issues, promoting citizen exchange, and collaborative ventures in areas the government does not fund. Even though many Americans have participated in exchanges, they have received little publicity. Overall, U.S.-Soviet exchanges have been beneficial to the United States and have provided Soviet citizens with the chance to see positive aspects of American life. Areas that foundations might address include assessing past programs, promoting exchanges to the public, funding programs for young leaders, increasing collaborative ventures, identifying future problems, and involving new organizations. Finally, media treatment of U.S.-USSR relations should be studied and business encouraged to support normalization of trade relations. (IS)

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U.S. SOVIET EXCHANGES -- THE KINDS OF  
EXCHANGES THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE; WHAT  
WORKS; HOW CAN THEY BE MADE MORE EFFECTIVE

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A number of foundations have raised questions regarding the range of exchanges that have taken place between the U.S. and the USSR over the past 25 years and regarding the comparative effectiveness of those exchanges. These questions have been raised in the broad context of overall U.S.-USSR relations. This memorandum suggests some answers to those questions and makes a number of recommendations regarding the future of U.S.-USSR exchanges, particularly from the perspective of enhancing their impact on the U.S. public.

At the outset, it should be noted that until recently, by far the largest volume of U.S.-Soviet exchange activity took place under the auspices of formal intergovernmental agreements and was funded by various federal agencies. At present, the level and quality of U.S.-Soviet exchanges are at an extremely low level because of the Reagan administration's "linkage" policy, which makes the U.S. government's support of exchange activities dependent upon the overall political relationship between the two countries and, further,

because of the administration's belief that the benefits to the Soviets, at least from the scientific and technical exchanges, outweigh the benefits to the U.S.\*/ In regard to the latter, the Administration is concerned that the Soviets will acquire "militarily significant technology."

The position of the Reagan administration follows close on the heels of the Carter administration's refusal in 1979 to renew the General Agreement on Cultural Relations between the U.S. and the USSR because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. As individual agreements between the two countries on scientific and technical cooperation (see below) have expired, the Reagan administration has chosen not to renew those involving U.S. "high technology" -- i.e., the agreements to collaborate in outer space and in the peaceful uses of atomic energy, and the general agreement to cooperate in science and technology. It has honored currently effective agreements to the extent it has deemed them advantageous to the U.S. At present, U.S.-USSR exchanges in the field of scientific and technical cooperation are roughly 20% of the level they reached in 1979; and virtually no "cultural" exchanges (exhibits, performing groups, film producers, etc.) are currently taking place.

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\*/ Consistent with this position, the Administration has opposed pending legislation that would provide substantial funding increases for U.S.-Soviet exchange programs (HR 3500), that would provide funding for graduate and advanced studies programs related to the USSR and East Europe (HR 601), and that would support exchanges of young people between the U.S. and the USSR. (H.J.R. 254).

In addition to the government funded programs, a significant number of programs involving exchanges between the U.S. and the USSR are funded by the private sector. Foundation support for such exchanges has fluctuated over the years in response to government funding patterns, with the foundations reducing their contributions as the government expenditures in this area increased. Recently, as the popular interest in U.S.-Soviet relations has translated into an increase in applications for funding, the foundations have stepped up their activity in this area.<sup>\*/</sup> Major foundations are funding centers of scholarship on Russian history, culture and government as well as studies related to arms control and disarmament and various advocacy projects designed to influence public policy. In addition, private individuals, corporations and churches are supporting a variety of projects to improve U.S.-Soviet relations and to encourage peace and disarmament.

As is more fully developed below, it is extremely difficult to obtain reliable comprehensive figures on the levels of either government or private funding for U.S.-Soviet relations and/or exchanges. However, according to the best estimates available, funding levels -- both public and private -- remain relatively low.

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<sup>\*/</sup> The foundation community has recently established a loose coordinating mechanism for its efforts in the field of U.S.-USSR relations. For several months, a group of the smaller "liberal" foundations has met to share information about grants and grantees. They are now taking steps to involve the larger, more "establishment," foundations.

One generally reliable indicator of such funding levels is the amount of support given to centers for Soviet studies. Until the 1983 Harriman grant to Columbia, funding for Soviet studies (broadly defined) had declined 70% in the last twenty years. As one observer put it:

"To put it bluntly: the field is in serious trouble and, with it, our national capacity to analyze Soviet and East European affairs -- just when the need is greater than ever before. Despite a series of remarkable postwar achievements that established the United States as the world leader in Soviet and East European research, we now see the retirement of senior personnel without replacements in prospect, a lack of organizational and intellectual focus, and a financial famine that threatens the few remaining islands of institutional cohesion and innovation.\*/"

Historical Background: Although a limited number of private exchanges took place between the U.S. and the USSR from the period of the Soviet revolution until the 1930's when Stalin consolidated his power, all exchanges of any kind were virtually terminated from the mid 1930's until the late 1950's. At that time, as part of the process of de-Stalinization, Krushchev indicated a willingness to end the USSR's political and cultural isolation. From the outset, the U.S. favored the unregulated movement of cultural and other groups between the two countries, while the Soviets insisted on an official agreement that would regulate the extent,

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\*/ From comments of Allen H. Kassov, Executive Director in 1980-81 Annual Report of the International Research & Exchanges Board (IREX).

quantity, and nature of exchanges. The latter position prevailed and, the first U.S.-USSR Cultural Exchange Agreement was signed in 1958. It provided for the exchange of students and academics, including scientists, for the exchange of "exhibits", for the exchange of performing arts groups and for the encouragement of tourism between the two countries. The agreement was for two years in duration and was renewed with regularity until 1972.

In 1972 and 1973, as part of the process of detente initiated by President Nixon, major changes occurred in the structure and nature of U.S.-Soviet exchanges. In regard to scientific and technical exchanges, the U.S. and USSR signed a series of agreements that, for the first time, went beyond the simple exchange of specialists to provide for cooperative efforts in various fields of research. The first four of these agreements, signed at the 1972 Summit Meeting between the leaders of the two nations, provided for cooperation in problem-solving in science and technology, environmental protection, space exploration, and medical science and public health. These were followed by agreements pertaining to agriculture, artificial heart research, peaceful uses of atomic energy, housing and other construction, transportation and studies of world ocean systems.\*/

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\*/ In addition, non-governmental agreements of technical cooperation were signed between a number of U.S. industrial firms and Soviet counterparts. Finally, the National Academy of Sciences and the Academy of Sciences of the USSR have conducted a program of exchanges since 1959. The NAS 1982 budget for Soviet programs was roughly \$500,000.

In 1973, the first long-term (six years) cultural exchange agreement was signed, incorporating the executive agreements described above and committing the signatories to additional agreements in science and technology as well as to broad exchanges in the fields of education (including teaching materials), the performing arts, the film industries, and radio and television (including joint production of television films). The parties also agreed to encourage the exchange of books and other publications (including exchanges of journalists), the exchange of exhibits on mutually selected topics, reciprocal exchanges of writers, artists, and various specialists, and of athletes and athletic teams. Finally, exchanges of state and local governmental leaders, and representatives of civic organizations were to be encouraged and provisions were included for facilitating exchanges of national political leaders.

Funding Levels, Program Objectives and Organizational Responsibility: No reliable figures are available regarding the prior or current costs of the government-to-government programs, although the total expenditures appear to have been relatively modest, except in those cases where capital equipment was involved -- or in the joint space program.<sup>\*/</sup> According to one estimate, between 1958 and 1977 the total cost to the government of the academic exchange

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<sup>\*/</sup> In this area, the U.S. investment reached \$280 million.

program -- including both private and public funding and including programs for Eastern Europe as well as the Soviet Union -- did not exceed \$50 million, an average of \$2.2 million per year. The budget for IREX (International Research and Exchange Board -- the group that runs the academic exchanges) for 1982 was \$2.6 million. This included East European as well as Soviet exchanges. The State Department, in a recent report to Congress on Scientific Exchange Activities for FY 1981 and 1982, reported U.S. program costs for 1982 of \$1,838,519 and personnel costs of \$21,784 for a total of: \$1,860,303. The activity level under these agreements was substantially higher in the mid and late 70's and probably reached \$5 to \$8 million a year. And, the total cost of the cultural exchanges per year averaged around \$500,000.

The overall objectives of the U.S. government program have never been clearly defined. The Fullbright Act, which provides the general framework for exchange programs states that such programs will enable the U.S. to increase mutual understanding between the peoples of different nations "by means of educational and cultural exchanges and thus to assist in the development of friendly, sympathetic and peaceful relations . . ." President Nixon, in addressing a joint session of Congress in June, 1972, stated the purposes of the joint collaborative agreements in science and technology as follows:

"By forming habits of cooperation and strengthening institutional ties in areas of peaceful enterprise, these four agreements . . . will create on both sides a steadily growing vested interest in the maintenance of good relations between our two countries."\*/

And, the Twentieth Century Fund defined the purposes of the academic and cultural exchanges as follows: "to deepen our understanding of Soviet society; to acquire knowledge in the fields in which the Soviets may be more advanced; to introduce Soviet scientists, scholars, and creative artists to new ideas and new approaches; to establish personal relationships between experts in all fields; and, through so doing, to convey to as many individuals at as many levels of Soviet society as possible, an accurate representation, and full picture of life in the United States."\*\*/ As is discussed more fully below, some of these objectives have been achieved but the achievement of "peaceful relations" and "a vested interest in good relations" remains elusive.

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\*/ Nixon further described the Agreements as follows:

"Recognizing the responsibility of the advanced industrial nations to set an example in combating mankind's common enemies, the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to cooperate in efforts to reduce pollution and enhance environmental quality. We have agreed to work together in the field of medical science and public health, particularly in the conquest of cancer and heart disease."

\*\*/ From The Raised Curtain: Report of the 20th Century Fund Task Force on Soviet-American Scholarly and Cultural Exchanges." 1977.

Organizationally, responsibility for U.S. government sponsored exchanges with the USSR is scattered. Cultural exchanges have been placed under the auspices of the Department of State. Scholarly exchanges, which were originally administered by the Inter-University Committee on Travel Grants (until 1971) are currently administered by IREX, a private organization that is part of the American Council of Learned Societies and that receives roughly 65% of its funding from the government (USICA and the National Endowment for the Humanities). The agreements pertaining to scientific and technical cooperation are administered by a joint commission that reports to the State Department but day-to-day management of the programs is assigned to the U.S. government agency with substantive responsibility for the subject matter of the exchange.\*/

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\*/ The following table indicates the subject matter of the 11 agreements, the responsible U.S. agency, the year the agreement was signed and the date of the last renewal.

TABLE I

| <u>Agreement</u>             | <u>Responsible<br/>U.S. Agency</u> | <u>Year<br/>Signed</u> | <u>Last<br/>Renewed</u> |
|------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|
| Agriculture                  | Department of Agriculture          | 1973                   | 1983                    |
| Artificial Heart<br>Research | National Institute of Health       | 1974                   | 1981                    |
| Energy                       | Department of Energy               | 1974                   | exp. 1982               |
| Environmental<br>Protection  | Environmental Protection<br>Agency | 1972                   | 1981                    |

Footnote continued on next page

On the government side, funding has been scattered among numerous agencies with no central coordination. This has obscured the total sums expended from Congressional scrutiny (and hostility during Cold War periods) and has, at the same time, militated against careful assessment. On the private funding side, an even broader range of players is involved -- again making overall assessment difficult.

Private Programs: In addition to, and in some cases overlapping the federally supported programs described above, there has been a continuing flow of private funding to support various types of exchanges between the U.S. and the USSR. The major grantees include: groups focusing on the promotion of disarmament and arms control outside of official governmental channels, such as the Dartmouth Process, the United Nations Association, the Carnegie Endowment for

(Footnote continued)

|                                         |                                                  |      |                   |
|-----------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|------|-------------------|
| Housing & Other<br>Construction         | Department of Housing & Urban<br>Development     | 1974 | 1979              |
| Medical Science &<br>Public Health      | National Institute of Health                     | 1971 | 1982              |
| Peaceful Uses of<br>Atomic Energy       | Department of Energy                             | 1973 | ( ) <sup>1/</sup> |
| Scientific & Tech-<br>nical Cooperation | Office of Science &<br>Technology Policy         | 1972 | exp. 1982         |
| Space Cooperation                       | NASA                                             | 1972 | exp. 1982         |
| Studies of the<br>World Oceans          | National Oceanic &<br>Atmospheric Administration | 1973 | 1981              |
| Transportation                          | Department of Transportation                     | 1973 | ( ) <sup>1/</sup> |

<sup>1/</sup> These Agreements, due to expire in June of 1983, were being negotiated as of late July 1983.

International Peace, and the Committee on East-West Accord;\*/ advocacy groups challenging official U.S. policy, particularly as it pertains to the Defense Department and to Arms Control policy, such as the Center for Defense Information, the Committee for National Security, the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, the Institute for Policy Studies, Citizens Against Nuclear War and Business Executives for National Security; \*\*/ groups promoting the study of the Russian language and culture or of Soviet studies, such as the American Council of Teachers of Russian and the various academic centers (Harvard, Columbia, Brown, Stanford, Indiana, The Kennan Center, etc.); groups seeking to promote "detente," "friendship" or "understanding," such as the Citizens Exchange Council, Friendship Force or the National Council of American Soviet Friendship; and groups seeking to foster collaborative efforts in specific fields, such as the Delphi Research Associates (collaboration in housing and related fields) and the Esalen Institute (collaboration in human potential research, in wholistic health, in telecommunications, etc.).

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\*/ Additional "establishment" organizations focusing on the study of U.S. and USSR arms control and disarmament policies include: the Aspen Institute, the Roosevelt Center and the Harvard Law School.

\*\*/ The advocacy groups are not primarily concerned with U.S.-USSR exchanges but instead focus on "re-educating" the American public and providing the public with alternative sources of information other than those provided by the Administration and the Pentagon.

Additionally, a number of organizations, such as the U.S.-USSR Trade and Economic Council, seek to promote or facilitate trade between the two countries. Recently, they have been joined by a number of states that have set up international trade offices. Some of these, especially in food producing states, are promoting trade with the USSR.

Finally, and of great importance, is the emergence of the churches, both through umbrella organizations such as the National Council of Churches and the Churches Center for Theology and Public Policy, and through individual denominations, as strong voices seeking nuclear disarmament as well as improved overall relations between the U.S. and the USSR.

Specific figures regarding the funding of these organizations are not available;\*/ however, a ball park estimate indicates that current annual funding levels for the organizations listed above (not including the Trade Council the church budgets) range between \$3 and \$4 million. This does not include the substantial private funding allocated to university-based centers of Soviet studies\*\*/ or long-term studies of specific topics such as disarmament negotiations.

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\*/ For a complete list of private organizations currently engaged in U.S.-USSR exchanges, see the ISAR Handbook of Organizations Involved in Soviet-American Relations, published in 1983. The handbook reports 187 organizations "engaged at least to some degree in Soviet-American work."

\*\*/ During 1982-83, Stanford University received a \$1 million grant from the Rockefeller Foundation for Soviet studies; the Columbia Russian Research Center was the recipient of \$11 million from the Harrimans and Brown received a substantial donation from Thomas J. Watson, Jr. to create the Center for Foreign Policy Development. Indiana University's Russian and East European Institute had a 1982 annual budget of roughly \$2.5 million -- 95% of which was funded by the state.

The privately-funded programs share many of the objectives of the government-to-government programs. The private programs have the additional objectives of: educating the American public about the Soviet Union and about the major political issues dividing the U.S. and the USSR, creating and advocating policy alternatives to those posed by governmental policymakers, encouraging direct exposure of U.S. citizens to life in the USSR and/or to the Soviet point of view and promoting collaborative ventures in areas that the government is not likely to fund. The private programs also seek to build non-governmental, academic resources in the U.S. that will enhance the nation's long-term capability to relate to the Soviet Union.

#### ASSESSMENT OF PARTICIPANTS AND OF PROGRAM IMPACTS

Over the past twenty years, a broad range of publicly and privately supported exchange programs has taken place between the U.S. and the USSR, involving thousands of participants. No history exists of these exchanges and no systematic assessments have been made of their impact or effectiveness. In subject matter, the exchanges have covered virtually all aspects of life. This movement has been supplemented by the informal movement of tourists, with 50,000 Americans visiting the USSR in 1982 and roughly one-eighth that number of Soviet tourists coming to the U.S. Although Americans from all walks of life have participated in the

exchanges, on the Soviet side, as would be expected, the exchange participants have been selected from a relatively small circle, with many repeat performers. Despite U.S. efforts to pressure the Soviets to expand the range and background of their participants, progress in this regard has been slow but continuous.

The overwhelming majority of U.S. participants in U.S.-Soviet exchanges have been from the academic community (including non-profit think-tanks) and the arts, including students and specialists in Soviet studies, international relations and political science, as well as leaders of the scientific community. Much smaller participation has occurred from the business community and there has been only a trickle of exchanges involving journalists and representatives of the media, union leaders, political leaders, attorneys and the like. As one observer put it, "By and large, from both sides, the participants in the exchanges have been people who study things rather than people who do things."

For a variety of reasons, including under-representation of the media in exchanges, the heavy concentration on academics and an unwritten government policy against publicity, the general public has remained virtually ignorant of the scale or scope of the exchanges, with the exception of certain major performing groups. Overall, the public remains ignorant of the fact that constructive dialogue continues between the U.S. and the USSR through informal channels even

during periods of intense hostility; similarly, the public remains ignorant of the mutual benefits gained from shared scientific research -- as in the collaboration in space programs -- and, more particularly, of the sophisticated Soviet contributions to some of the joint projects. The failure to publicize the programs has minimized their utility as a vehicle for educating the American public about the Soviet Union and about U.S.-Soviet relations.

Program Impact: There is no question that, as a general proposition, the U.S.-Soviet exchanges have been beneficial to the U.S. and have met major U.S. objectives. Cumulatively, they have provided an opportunity for presenting to Soviet citizens positive aspects of American life,<sup>\*/</sup> thereby, overcoming in small part, the barrage of anti-U.S. propaganda to which the Soviet citizen is subjected. They have created an opening in the iron curtain that has exposed at least some Soviets to new ideas and to a more realistic understanding of the West. Conversely, they have

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<sup>\*/</sup> In assessing the academic and cultural exchanges, the Twentieth Century Fund concluded in 1979 that:

"the major benefit of these exchanges for the United States is that they provide an open window for viewing American accomplishments and freedoms . . . The positive view of American abundance and freedom is transmitted via the extensive Soviet 'grapevine' to large numbers of Soviet citizens, especially in the political elite and in the intellectual and artistic communities."

helped thousands of Americans to understand to some extent, the culture, values and economy of the Soviet Union.

Looking at the progress from the U.S. perspective: (1) academic exchanges, joint seminars, exhibits and similar programs have become an integral, indispensable aspect of the training of the American Sovietologists who serve government, academia and non-profit organizations. (2) Scientific and technical exchanges have served to inform U.S. experts regarding the level of knowledge and research in given fields in the Soviet Union; by sharing the results of Soviet experimentation and research they have enabled U.S. scientists to learn from Soviet mistakes as well as to benefit from their data; and, in certain areas, such as space research, they have enabled the U.S. to piggyback on Soviet experiments as if they had been performed by the U.S.\*/

(3) Exchanges of "leaders" have been more amorphous and their results more difficult to assess, in part because of

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\*/ Even with the Reagan Administration's cut backs for collaboration in space, a State Department assessment of the value of the program during 1982 concluded that: "the overall value of the scientific and technical information clearly favored the U.S." Not only did U.S. scientists share in the data and results from the Soviet's March, 1982 Venus lander mission, but, in addition, the U.S. continued to receive the raw data from Soviet CAT scans of cosmonaut crews involved in long-duration manned spaceflight. Because of the current focus of the U.S. manned spaceflight program on short-duration flights, the Soviet Union was the only available source for such data. The State Department also noted that because U.S. scientists "were given free flight opportunities for their experiments on three Soviet biosatellite missions," the U.S. was able to save "millions of dollars during a period in which no comparable U.S. biosatellite program existed."

the difficulty of identifying long-term leaders in the U.S. and the corresponding difficulty of gaining access to the more readily identifiable long-term leaders in the USSR. In a number of instances, these exchanges have successfully served as alternative channels for bi-lateral communications during periods of hostility; in other instances, they have led to new programs of collaboration in either the government or the private sector. At the least, they have enlarged that segment of the U.S. public that is informed about the USSR.

(4) In regard to business exchanges, commercial intercourse has been a weather vane of governmental relations between the U.S. and the USSR. With the exception of a few individual leaders, such as Armand Hammer, Donald Kendall, Robert Schmidt and William Norris, the business community has followed the government's lead, eager to trade when the Administration endorses trade and unwilling to engage in commercial activities with the Soviets when the Administration opposes trade. This can be explained in large part by the indiscriminate use of trade embargoes that has characterized recent administrations, but it is also due, in part, to the fact that no strong organizations exist to promote trade or to train emerging business leaders regarding developments in the Soviet Union. The existing organizations are simply too passive and too unwilling to challenge or question

current State Department positions.\* / On the business side, there is a need to examine the long-term potential for U.S.-Soviet trade (looking in part to the European experience), to reassess the "sanctity of contract" problem and the utility of foreign policy embargoes (as opposed to national security embargoes), to better educate the U.S. businessman regarding counter-trade and similar Eastern bloc patterns of doing business, to analyze U.S. paranoia re the "theft" of American technology and, at the same time, to make the U.S. business community aware of the possibilities for acquiring certain advanced Soviet technology.

Suggestions for the Future: Given the background on U.S.-Soviet exchanges set forth above, the question remains of how a private foundation can most effectively invest its funds if it is interested in improving U.S.-Soviet relations and, in particular, in advancing the dialogue between the two nations regarding nuclear disarmament. The following suggestions attempt to address this question in summary form:

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\* / The above summary does not intend to minimize past problems with the exchanges. There is no question that effective exchanges are extremely difficult to design, the Soviets are often reluctant to grant the access to people and facilities that is necessary to make the exchanges work and, at least initially, the Soviets attempted to use the scientific and technical exchanges as a vehicle for acquiring new technology. In short, the Soviets have presented and will continue to present all of the problems of a closed society. Nonetheless, the U.S. has achieved many of the purposes it sought to achieve through the exchanges and without them, it suffers a serious deficit in understanding the world's other super power.

1. As a top priority, foundation funding should be provided to assess the impact of the past twenty-five years of U.S. government funded exchanges to develop recommendations for improving those exchanges and to educate the public regarding the importance of government funding for this activity.<sup>\*/</sup> This should be done with a view to influencing governmental policy, once exchanges are resumed, to make them more effective. The review should be conducted under the sponsorship of an "establishment" organization or by an ad hoc committee of individuals with recognized credentials. In the course of the review, consultations should be conducted with individuals who have had extensive experience with government funded U.S.-Soviet exchanges, such as the Director of IREX, a former staffer from DOS/CU who ran the exchanges, a representative of the National Academy of Sciences, current or former staff on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and others.<sup>\*\*/</sup>

2. A leader in the foundation community should take the initiative in exploring ways in which the mutual benefits of the U.S.-USSR exchange program can be conveyed to the public. This might be done, for example, by a foundation

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<sup>\*/</sup> This paper takes it as a given that the government must play a lead role and must support educational, cultural and scientific exchanges.

<sup>\*\*/</sup> This strategy, of using limited private funds to leverage and define major public investments, has proven extremely useful in regard to energy and environmental, civil rights and women's issues. It should be equally effective in the context of international exchanges.

such as Kettering that is active in the field, taking steps to share with the public the positive aspects of the Dartmouth process and the expertise of its participants; or, it might be done in a more organized fashion through a coordinating council composed of major foundation participants in the field. In any event, the U.S. public should be informed of the range of exchanges normally conducted between the two countries and should benefit from the knowledge gained about the Soviet Union in those exchanges.\*/ Doing this should create a more informed public, more capable of participating in policy debates concerning U.S.-Soviet relations.

3. Foundation supported exchange programs, both ongoing and new programs, should include a focus on young leaders, as part of a long-term commitment. At present, programs that involve discussions among leading private U.S. citizens and Soviets, such as the UNA program, do not have mechanisms for identifying and involving emerging young leaders. Such mechanisms should be developed. Equally important, new long-term programs should be developed that focus on leaders in sectors currently under-represented in U.S.-Soviet exchanges, such as the media (including journalists), middle-level business managers (from banking, manufacturing and agribusiness), state and local politicians,

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\*/ The Institute for Soviet-American Relations (ISAR) is attempting to publicize the results of U.S.-USSR exchanges with very limited funds. This effort is a step in the right direction.

judges and attorneys, college presidents and others who are likely future candidates for leadership positions in the U.S.

Consideration should be given to the establishment of a U.S.-USSR Relations Fellows Program, patterned along the lines of the White House Fellows program. Under such a program, young American leaders from a variety of sectors would be assigned to policy-level positions dealing with U.S.-Soviet relations. On the government side, such positions would logically be located in, the White House, the Departments of State, Defense, Commerce and Agriculture, USIA and other agencies. Additional assignments might appropriately include non-profit organizations that influence U.S. policy towards the USSR, such as the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Foreign Affairs Council, the U.S.-USSR Trade and Economic Council, etc.\*

4. An effort to initiate new "joint ventures" similar to the government-sponsored cooperation in space venture should be undertaken with private support. One important lesson to be learned from the bi-lateral collaborative scientific and technical agreements signed in 1972 and 1973 is that great benefit is to be gained from cooperative ventures in those areas where the two participants

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\*/ If the program is a success, the U.S. sponsors might want to propose to the Soviets an extension that would include assignments to Arbatov's Institute and other Soviet agencies, with comparable assignments of young Soviets being made to U.S. institutions.

are of relatively equal status.<sup>\*/</sup> Despite popular misconceptions to the contrary, the Soviets equal or surpass the U.S. in a number of technical fields; in such fields collaborative efforts avoid duplication of effort while maximizing individual capabilities. They also build trust between representatives of the scientific elite in both societies.

In the non-scientific realm, Kettering's Dartmouth process is currently demonstrating that joint efforts may be effective in regard to the avoidance of conflict in the mid-East. IREX is exploring a similar collaborative effort in regard to Latin American policy. The Esalen Institute is similarly involved in a number of projects where Soviets and Americans work side-by-side, the most dramatic of which have been the satellite transmissions of simultaneous TV presentations.<sup>\*\*/</sup> Foundation funds should be invested to explore additional fields of collaboration, whether they deal with advancing scientific knowledge, improving relations between the two super-powers in other regions of the world, combining their resources to assist less developed countries,

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<sup>\*/</sup> The Soviets are reluctant to admit their own problems or deficiencies and thus, would not accept U.S. "aid" in such areas. The U.S. would undoubtedly have a similar response in regard to one of its major problems.

<sup>\*\*/</sup> Although to date the subject matter of these "hook-ups" has been light entertainment, they have demonstrated the potential for direct communication between the two countries. The Soviet Academy of Sciences and one of its leading ministries is reportedly committed to expanding this type of activity.

or seeking solutions to mutual problems (e.g., low productivity, dispute resolution, etc.). Once the fields for collaboration are selected,<sup>\*/</sup> foundations should provide seed money, with the hope that those programs involving major expenditures will be absorbed by the government.

5. Private funders should seek to anticipate the major problems of the future between the two nations and to address these problems through private consultations before the two governments develop rigid positions that make debate difficult if not impossible, as appears to be the case in regard to disarmament talks. Two subjects that come immediately to mind in this category are the peaceful use of outer space and certain aspects of the law of the sea. These are areas where, unless present efforts are made to establish systems to avoid conflict, conflict will certainly arise.

6. Looking for New Players: Over the past two to three years, coincident with the emphasis on defense build-up and the anti-Sovietism of the Reagan administration, a number of new non-profit organizations have emerged that are concerned with U.S.-Soviet relations and/or with the problems of peace and disarmament, which, unavoidably assume a U.S.-Soviet focus. Some of these groups fill some of the gaps in

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<sup>\*/</sup> In setting up the scientific and technical exchanges described above, the U.S. government made extensive inquiry regarding appropriate areas of collaboration. This background information -- particularly, in the fields of environmental protection, health and medicine and outer space should be most useful to private funders.

participation in the exchange program described above, e.g., businessmen, attorneys, journalists, etc. Although many of them were created in a crisis atmosphere, responding to the current hostility between the U.S. and the USSR, it can be hoped that the more effective organizations will seek to improve U.S.-Soviet relations over the long haul. At the least, they bring new energy to a "tired" field.

Among such groups are: Business Executives for National Security, the Lawyers Alliance for Nuclear Arms Control, Inc.<sup>\*/</sup> the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, Citizens Against Nuclear War and the Esalen Institute's U.S.-USSR project.<sup>\*\*/</sup> Foundations seeking to enter the U.S.-Soviet relations field should look at these groups in addition to the more established, traditional groups active in the field.

The foundation community should focus on two additional areas not now receiving adequate attention.

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<sup>\*/</sup> This group is based in Boston, as is the Harvard Law School's Nuclear Negotiation Project. Both groups focus on nuclear arms control negotiations and the Lawyers' Alliance recently met with their Soviet counterparts to explore new legal initiatives in the disarmament debate. It is possible, however, that one or the other or both could be developed into a legal institution with a broader focus capable of examining the full range of international and domestic law issues affecting U.S.-USSR relations, such as laws pertaining to outer space, the law of the seas, etc.

<sup>\*\*/</sup> This group was described by one observer as playing the same role in regard to lobbying for nuclear controls that the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights had played in regard to civil rights issues.

Consideration should be given to the creation of a special media project, perhaps under an advisory board composed of former U.S. TV and newspaper reporters assigned to Moscow, plus some "new communicators" to study the media treatment of U.S.-USSR relations, in much the same way the media treatment of U.S. race relations was studied in the late '60's. The media project should also look at the potential in new telecommunications technology for improved, diversified contacts between the U.S. and the USSR (following up on the Esalen project).

Secondly, an effort should be made to develop stronger, long-term support among the U.S. business community for normal trade relations with the Soviet Union. The U.S.-Soviet relationship needs trade. Yet there are no existing organizations seeking to promote trade regardless of current administration attitudes; nor are any efforts being made to assist small and medium-sized corporations to enter the field. As a result, few business leaders are aware of the substantial trade opportunities that exist in the Soviet Union or knowledgeable about the history, culture or current conditions of the USSR. Given the significant role that the business community plays in U.S. policymaking, this is a serious deficit. Foundations should consider a range of approaches to addressing this problem that, at the least, would address the needs discussed on page 18 above.

Finally, contact should be established with the various church groups that are becoming increasingly active in peace/disarmament/Soviet relations issues. Church leaders have ongoing contacts with the Soviet churches, both directly and through the World Council of Churches; in addition, their communications network is one of the most extensive and most effective in American society.

7. Bolstering the Educational Establishment:

The whole way that Americans are educated to think about the Soviet Union needs to be reexamined. A media project, such as that described above, would take a major step in this direction, at least as it pertains to that form of education. This paper has already referred to the academic centers of scholarship on the Soviet Union, some of which have, over the past year, been the subject of a much needed rescue operation. Continued substantial investment in these centers should be a top national priority. In addition, their performance should be analyzed to determine ways in which their work might be made more relevant to policy makers and ways that they might contribute more effectively to other disciplines.

Besides these forms of education, foundations should explore ways to educate elementary and secondary school children as well as the public at large regarding Russian history and the current realities of the Soviet state (via revised curriculum, TV documentaries, discussions by civic

organizations with local chapters, etc.) . Such a "campaign" is needed if we are to go beyond the "gee whiz, they're people just like us" phase to a more realistic understanding of the enormous differences in culture and values between our two countries and of the key historical events that have helped shape the very different reactions that the two peoples have to the same events.

Unanswered Questions: This memorandum has focused only on the U.S. side of the exchanges. It has not looked at the Soviet side either in terms of participants or benefits gained. Nor has it explored the question of how to reach a larger Soviet audience.

The benefits to the Soviets are obvious: the exchanges provide the Soviets an important vehicle for learning about the U.S. and for acquiring scientific information and know-how available only in the U.S. or the West. The exchanges also offer an effective vehicle for demonstrating Soviet cultural, athletic, etc. accomplishments to the U.S. public. They offer a similarly effective vehicle for demonstrating Soviet scientific and technical achievements (but, as noted above, have been underutilized for that purpose.) Finally, the exchanges are an avenue by which the Soviets can relate to the U.S. political party that is not in power, can cultivate powerful U.S. citizens who are in a position to influence Administration policy and can present Soviet positions and viewpoints to the U.S. public.

The question of how to reach a larger Soviet audience remains elusive. The programs that are most effective in involving the participation of Soviets of comparable backgrounds to that of the U.S. participants are the programs where the two sides are working together on common problems, whether it be the choreography of a dance or the design of a joint space mission. The programs that are least effective in involving Soviet peers are those that involve political discussions outside of official governmental channels or programs that involve U.S. groups for which there is no private counterpart in the USSR.

Although it is a given that the Soviet government is highly centralized and its political leaders isolated (at least by U.S. standards), it is also common knowledge that academic and scientific elites as well as leaders of production ("businessmen"), the military and other fields participate, at least to some degree, in the decision-making process. Given this situation, combined with the inevitability of new leaders replacing the current gerontocracy, it is clearly important for those foundations concerned with U.S.-Soviet relations over the long haul, to support exchanges and working programs of young leaders in a range of fields of central importance to both societies.

**END**

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